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Left alone, en la oscuridad, without hope, sin oportunidad,  
In a cage, como puedes verme asi, un monstruo, un demonio 
Because of you, nunca entenderás mi angustia  
Each day, I ask, mis gritos caen en un suelo frío y duro 
Release me, ¿Qué te hice?  
They told you a lie, te dijeron que soy un monstruo  
All for what? Si me cortan, ¿no sangro? 
Don’t tell me you can’t understand, tal vez si lo pongo en tu idioma 
me darás mi 
Libertad.1 
INTRODUCTION 
old and sleep-deprived, Franklin, an eleven-year-old Honduran 
boy, was woken up by guards at 3 a.m. and fed cold, raw ham.2 
Subjected to jail-like conditions, Franklin and his seven-year-old 
brother, Byron, were separated from their mother for nearly a month 
and a half, ultimately reuniting in New York while the family’s asylum 
case was being processed here in the United States.3 As unfortunate as 
Franklin’s experience was, one would hope that it was an isolated and 
rare incident, but the general public came to learn that by May 31, 2018, 
approximately 2,000 migrant children4 from Latin America shared 
Franklin’s experience. With the swift backlash following these 
revelations, President Trump reversed course to nominally end family 
separation and avoid any further political fallout.5  
True to form, however, President Trump did make some statements 
regarding the situation. Using Twitter, often a vehicle for his rhetoric, 
President Trump stated that “criminals” employ the tactic of using 
1 Poem by Gilbert Alexander Cotto-Lazo, LIBERTAD (2020). 
2 Daniella Silva, ‘Like I Am Trash’: Migrant Children Reveal Stories of Detention, 
Separation, NBC NEWS (July 29, 2018, 9:44 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino 
/i-am-trash-migrant-children-reveal-stories-detention-separation-n895006 [https://perma.cc 
/MYK2-D4BM]. 
3 Id.  
4 Maya Rhodan, Here Are the Facts About President Trump’s Family Separation Policy, 
TIME, https://time.com/5314769/family-separation-policy-donald-trump/ [https://perma.cc 
/N83S-TCCH] (June 20, 2018, 10:37 AM). 
5 John Cassidy, Why a Rogue President Was Forced to Back Down on Family Separation, 
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children to gain entry to our country, and he laid blame on “Democratic 
legislation.”  
Children are being used by some of the worst criminals on earth as a 
means to enter our country. Has anyone been looking at the Crime 
[sic] taking place south of the border. [sic] It is historic, with some 
countries the most dangerous places in the world. Not going to 
happen in the U.S.6 
Separating families at the Border [sic] is the fault of bad legislation 
passed by the Democrats. Border Security [sic] laws should be 
changed but the Dems can’t get their act together! Started the Wall 
[sic].7 
Though it is difficult to respond to the volume of misleading and 
overwhelmingly unsupported statements by President Trump in those 
tweets, one fact is clear: on April 6, 2018, Jeff Sessions, then Attorney 
General, directed “all U.S. Attorney’s Offices along the Southwest 
Border” to implement a “new ‘zero-tolerance policy,’” which amounts 
to a directive to prosecute all Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
referrals of “attempted illegal entry and illegal entry into the United 
States by an alien.”8  
President Trump’s immigration policies served as the catalyst for the 
humanitarian crisis that marred the Trump administration during and 
following the midterm elections in 2018.9 This period in U.S. politics 
demonstrated that an overwhelming majority of the U.S. public 
denounced this approach to immigration.10  
Indeed, that the Trump administration is able to punitively separate 
children from families at the border only highlights the fact that an 
administration willing to take such measures could not do so but for the 
structural failings of the immigration system. These structural failings 
stem from three main categories: (1) the credible fear interview; (2) the 
6 THE TWEETS OF PRESIDENT DONALD J. TRUMP: THE MOST LIKED AND RETWEETED 
TWEETS FROM THE INAUGURATION THROUGH THE IMPEACHMENT TRIAL 201 (2020).  
7 Fact Check: Trump Blames Democrats for His Policy of Separating Kids from 
Parents at Border, NBC NEWS (June 5, 2018, 7:27 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics 
/politics-news/fact-check-trump-blames-democrats-his-policy-separating-kids-parents 
-n880091.
8 Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Attorney General Announces Zero-Tolerance Policy
for Criminal Illegal Entry (Apr. 6, 2018) [hereinafter Zero-Tolerance Policy], https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/attorney-general-announces-zero-tolerance-policy-criminal-illegal
-entry [https://perma.cc/SL7X-PZBU].
9 See Silva, supra note 2; see also Zero-Tolerance Policy, supra note 8.
10 See Rhodan, supra note 4. 
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discretion of the Attorney General; and (3) the current jurisprudence of 
Chevron deference in immigration law.  
In the following four Parts, this Article will make three arguments: 
(1) that structural administrative flaws—namely, the interview of each
person seeking asylum and agency review of that interview—result in
deprivation of due process rights of migrants; (2) that these same
structural flaws are compounded when the judiciary grants agency
deference to administrative decisions; and (3) that where political
accountability severely undermines a particular agency’s expertise,
such as in the immigration context, deference should either be amended
from its current form or not afforded at all.
Part I examines the history and current structure of immigration, 
asylum, and refugee laws in the United States as they pertain to 
modern-day immigration issues. Part II provides a historical overview 
of agency deference and its current role in the immigration context. Part 
III highlights the structural issues resulting from both the 
administrative state and agency deference and proposes potential 
solutions. Lastly, the Article concludes by reviewing the argument.  
I 
HISTORY AND CURRENT STRUCTURE OF U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM 
While the Trump administration’s punitive policy of separating 
children from their parents was the first exposure many in the United 
States had to the immigration system, the lesser-known fact is that 
U.S. foreign diplomacy, particularly with Latin America, created, 
directly and indirectly, many of the conditions that force migrants to 
seek asylum in the United States. Because the history of the 
immigration system and its current structure would be only a snapshot 
of its structural failings, an overview of U.S. diplomacy toward Latin 
America is appropriate. Accordingly, Section I.A discusses U.S. 
foreign policy with respect to Latin America. Section I.B examines the 
history of U.S. immigration laws and their current statutory framework. 
Section I.C provides a brief overview of the asylum process and its 
necessary standards. Finally, Section I.D examines the structural issues 
that have eroded due process protections for asylee applicants.  
A. The United States’ Backyard: A Backdrop of U.S. Policy Toward
Latin America
Though U.S. foreign diplomatic relations are largely outside the
scope of this Article, a brief overview of U.S.-Latin American relations 
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and the United States’ shifting policies toward Latin America is 
relevant for purposes of understanding the United States’ modern 
immigration system. Prior to the Second World War, the Roosevelt 
administration publicly stated that the United States would adopt 
the “Good Neighbor” policy, characterized by a noninterventionist 
principle toward Latin America.11 The Roosevelt administration, 
however, silently abandoned the noninterventionist stance and began 
disseminating anti-Communist propaganda in Latin America.12 
Toward that end, in El Salvador, for example, the United States 
provided authoritarian dictator Maximiliano Hernández Martínez with 
financial and military aid from the United States, which Martínez, in 
turn, employed to stamp out dissent in the lower-middle class.13  
This U.S. position of aiding and defending violent oppressive 
regimes in Latin America is not unique to the Roosevelt 
administration.14 In fact, both the Kennedy and Reagan administrations 
employed foreign policies in Latin America that, on their face, 
purported to support Latin American governments but were ultimately 
aimed at combating the threat of Communism.15 Indeed, U.S. support 
11 Jorrit van den Berk, The Promise of Democracy for the Americas: U.S. Diplomacy 
and the Meaning(s) of World War II in El Salvador, 1941-45, in POLITICS AND CULTURES 
OF LIBERATION 241, 243 (Hans Bak et al. eds., 2018). 
12 Id. at 244 (“The U.S. supported the dictators in the interest of local stability and the 
dictators supported the U.S. in order to be eligible for lend-lease aid, flexible trade and 
financial agreements, and prestigious United Nations status.”). 
13 Id. at 250–53. 
14 Id. at 254–56 (“[U.S. Minister to El Salvador, Robert] Frazer had publically [sic] 
defended the Martínez regime and its cooperative stance during the war and had allowed the 
dictator to adopt the pro-democratic language of the war while he was in effect a ‘nazi-
fascist.’”).  
15 Michael Dunne, Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress: Countering Revolution in Latin 
America: Part I: From the White House to the Charter of Punta del Este, 89 INT’L AFFAIRS 
1389, 1402 (2013) (“Kennedy [established] . . . a task force on Immediate Latin American 
problems. . . . [And one of its] basic assumptions . . . was that the greatest task of American 
diplomacy in Latin America [was] to divorce the inevitable and necessary . . . social 
transformation from connection with and prevent its capture by overseas Communist Power 
politics—the USSR and China being specifically identified as the foreign enemies. The 
other assumption was that the present Communist challenge in Latin America resembles, 
but is more dangerous than, the Nazi-Fascist threat of the Franklin Roosevelt period and 
demands an even bolder and more imaginative response.”) (internal quotations omitted); see 
also LARS SCHOULTZ, NATIONAL SECURITY AND UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD LATIN 
AMERICA 65 (1987) (“The Reagan administration was also successful in focusing policy 
debates upon what it believed was a linkage between instability in Nicaragua and El 
Salvador and a broader Soviet-Cuban effort to undermine U.S. power throughout the 
Caribbean region. As President Reagan noted, ‘a determined propaganda campaign has 
sought to mislead many in Europe and certainly many in the United States as to the true 
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of repressive and violent regimes created poor living conditions for 
many Latin Americans, and those conditions were exacerbated by the 
U.S. adoption of “Dollar Diplomacy”—characterized by “promot[ing] 
more open trade in [Latin America], unfettered opportunities for 
foreign investment . . . and new assistance in debt reduction”—which 
served to further worsen living conditions in Latin America and caused 
hundreds of thousands to seek refuge in the United States.16 With the 
foregoing as a backdrop, the following is an overview of the U.S. 
immigration system.  
B. U.S. Immigration History and Current Structure 
The development of U.S. immigration laws indicates a long history 
of discriminatory policies and legislative acts tending to restrict 
immigration from non-Western European countries.17 For example, the 
Immigration Act of 1875 and the subsequent Chinese Exclusion Act 
“endeavored to eliminate the problems associated with Chinese 
immigration.”18 Legislation following these discriminatory nineteenth 
century acts did not fare better. In fact, subsequent legislative acts 
imposed limitations on immigration including “(1) the exclusion of 
specific groups of immigrants, (2) barriers to immigration, such as 
literacy tests or tests of economic self-sufficiency, and (3) the . . . [use] 
of national origins quotas.”19  
Even where millions were displaced following World War II, the 
United States maintained a restrictive posture toward admission of 
refugees, which the United States considered to be a special class of 
immigrants.20 Recognized refugee statuses at the time included only 
nature of the conflict in El Salvador. Very simply, guerrillas, armed and supported by and 
through Cuba, are attempting to impose a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship on the people of El 
Salvador as part of a larger imperialistic plan.’”). 
16 David Sheinin, The New Dollar Diplomacy in Latin America, 37 AM. STUD. INT’L 81, 
87, 89, 95–96 (1999) (“Dollar diplomacy helped bring unemployment and poor living 
standards to hundreds of thousands of Latin Americans through privatizations and 
rationalizations by governments and businesses striving to compete in the global economy; 
many sought refuge in the US, including more than a million ‘illegal’ Central American 
immigrants in Los Angeles alone.”). 
17 Kathryn M. Bockley, A Historical Overview of Refugee Legislation: The Deception 
of Foreign Policy in the Land of Promise, 21 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REGUL. 253, 254–69 
(1995) (discussing the development of refugee law and noting that even when extremely 
restrictive systems were in place, such as the quota system, immigration from Western 
Europe remained unimpeded). 
18 Id. at 258.  
19 Id.  
20 Id. at 260–61. 
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persons fleeing from religious persecution and immediate family 
members of admissible foreign nationals.21 Refugee status did not 
include political persecution or carry with it the option of permanent 
residency in the United States.22 The continued use of the restrictive 
quota system, coupled with overt discriminatory attitudes of Congress 
and severe limitations in the Displaced Persons Act of 1948, resulted 
in limited admissions of Jewish refugees, despite the atrocities that 
occurred in World War II.23 
It was not until 1965 that Congress disposed of the restrictive and 
discriminatory quota system by passing the 1965 amendments 
(Amendments) to the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA).24 
Although the Amendments removed the discriminatory quota system, 
the Amendments were restrictive in two respects: (1) they limited 
admission of refugees to six percent of total immigration, and (2) they 
equated the concept of refugees with individuals fleeing Communist 
nations, thereby “creat[ing] a permanent ideological basis for 
admission.”25 Unfortunately, it was not until the Refugee Act of 1980 
(Refugee Act) that the United States adopted a less restrictive stance 
on immigration than its prior legislation.26 
In 1968, the United States signed onto the U.N. Protocol Relating to 
the Status of Refugees (Refugee Protocol), which incorporated the key 
substantive provisions of the 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the 
Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention).27 In 1980, when Congress 
enacted the Refugee Act for the purpose of conforming provisions of 
U.S. law to the Refugee Convention, the U.S. immigration system 
finally began to reflect the humanitarian approach of the Refugee 
Convention.28 Moreover, the Refugee Act was the  
21 Id.  
22 Id.  
23 Id. at 259, 261–63. The quota system was part of early twentieth-century legislation 
that set forth percentages of immigrants eligible for admission based on nationality and 
derived from percentages of the U.S. Census Bureau. Moreover, the quota system left 
immigration from Western European countries unrestricted. Id.  
24 Id. at 270.  
25 Id. at 270–71.  
26 Id. at 281.  
27 G.A. Res. 429 (V), Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, at 189 (July 28, 
1951); G.A. Res. 2198 (XXI), Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (Dec. 16, 1966). 
28 See H.R. REP. NO. 96-781 (1980) (Conf. Rep.); I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 
421, 436–37 (1987) (“[T]he definition of refugee that Congress adopted is virtually identical 
to the one prescribed by Article 1(2) of the [Refugee] Convention which defines a refugee 
as an individual who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, 
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first piece of legislation to establish a procedure for the application 
for asylum by a person physically present within the United States, 
or by one who presents herself at a U.S. border . . . [and it] broadened 
the grounds for withholding deportation to include persecution based 
on social group or nationality.29  
Despite this promising step, the Refugee Act has severe short-
comings.30 
C. Refugee Definition and Asylum Procedure
“Why are we having all these people from shithole countries [Haiti 
and El Salvador] come here?”31 This sentiment was not uttered in a 
dimly lit bar by a patron opining on news coverage of modern- 
day immigration issues. In fact, President Trump infamously uttered  
the sentiment, further expressing a preference for immigrants from 
predominately white European countries.32 However, migrants who 
come from the countries Trump harbors animus for are often escaping 
dire circumstances, and the asylum process serves as the primary 
meaningful recourse for their safety.33  
The asylum process not only provides “a path to lawful permanent 
resident status and citizenship” but it also “confers other benefits, 
including the right to work in the United States.”34 Importantly, the 
asylum procedure created by the Refugee Act allows for migrants to 
apply for asylum irrespective of their citizenship status, thereby 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail 
himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside 
the country of his former habitual residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling 
to return to it.”) (internal quotations omitted) (internal citations omitted); see also Bockley, 
supra note 17, at 260–62, 278–83.  
29 Bockley, supra note 17, at 282. 
30 Id. at 283 (“Three fundamental aspects of current refugee policy are largely 
responsible for the continuing ideological bias following the enactment of the Refugee Act: 
(1) the lack of guidelines regarding the proper definition of refugee, resulting in inconsistent
and restrictive requirements for the standard of proof required in order to establish refugee
status; (2) major flaws in the Department of Justice’s implementation of the Refugee Act;
and, (3) judicial disregard for the legislative intent of Section 203(e) of the Refugee Act
prohibiting the return of refugees to places of persecution.”).
31 Ramos v. Nielsen, 321 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1131 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (quoting President 
Trump and holding President Trump’s animus is imputed to Secretary Nielsen’s decision to 
remove the “shithole” countries from a list affording particular migrants due process 
protections).  
32 Id.  
33 See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 396–97 (2012). 
34 O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 118 (D.D.C. 2019). 
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creating statutory protection for any migrant who presents at a port of 
entry or is residing in the United States.35 Once a migrant applies for 
asylum by submitting an I-589 form,36 the Attorney General has 
discretion to grant asylum to the migrant-applicant, provided that the 
migrant-applicant is a refugee within the meaning of the INA.37  
Under the Refugee Act, a refugee is an individual who cannot or is 
“unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or 
herself of the protection” of their country of nationality “because of 
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, 
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion.”38 Under the Refugee Act, a refugee applying for 
asylum must satisfy the evidentiary standard for persecution (i.e., that 
the refugee has a “‘well-founded fear of persecution’”).39 The 
advantage of asylum status is that it provides a refugee with an 
opportunity to become a lawful permanent resident.40 Importantly, the 
Refugee Act does not delineate the types of evidence that would satisfy 
the well-founded fear standard.41 Another undefined standard that the 
Refugee Act introduced is persecution based on “membership in a 
particular social group” (“social group standard”).42 
35 Id. at 119. 
36 U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV., I-589, APPLICATION FOR ASYLUM AND FOR 
WITHHOLDING OF REMOVAL, https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/forms 
/i-589.pdf [https://perma.cc/92P8-FR6D].  
37 O.A., 404 F. Supp. 3d at 119.  
38 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).  
39 Bockley, supra note 17, at 283.  
40 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 230 (B.I.A. Mar. 1, 1985).  
41 See 8 U.S.C. § 1158 (b)(1)(B)(i)–(ii) (“The burden of proof is on [the refugee] to 
establish . . . that race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or 
political opinion was or will be at least one central reason for persecuting the applicant.”). 
The statute further states that testimony alone may be sufficient only if the trier of fact finds 
the applicant’s testimony credible, persuasive, and refers to specific facts supporting refugee 
status. Id. The “trier of fact may weigh the credible testimony along with other evidence of 
record. Where the trier of fact determines that the applicant should provide evidence that 
corroborates otherwise credible testimony, such evidence must be provided unless the 
applicant does not have the evidence and cannot reasonably obtain the evidence.” Id. 
42 Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 233 (“[W]e interpret the phrase ‘persecution on account of 
membership in a particular social group’ to mean persecution that is directed toward an 
individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable 
characteristic. The shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship 
ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former military 
leadership or land ownership.”). 
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D. Erosion of Procedural Protections for Asylees
While the Refugee Act established a uniform procedure for migrants 
to apply for asylum and escape harsh home-country conditions, various 
factors have eroded those same procedural protections since the 
adoption of the Refugee Act. The following Sections examine those 
factors ailing the immigration system: I.D.1—adoption of the 
expedited removal process; I.D.2—administrative structural biases; 
I.D.3—Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA or Board) decisions; and
I.D.4—intervention by the Attorney General.
1. Expedited Removal
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996 (IIRIRA) affected the due process rights of not only asylum 
applicants residing in the United States but also those presenting at U.S. 
borders and ports of entry.43 Prior to the IIRIRA, migrants seeking 
asylum were afforded evidentiary hearings on their asylum claims.44 
Those who presented at “ports of entry, including border ports,” would 
receive fewer procedural protections, but they would still be entitled to 
an “exclusion hearing before an immigration judge” on their claims.45 
At exclusion hearings, asylum applicants, both those who present at the 
border and those who apply while residing in the United States, could 
“present and receive evidence, give testimony, secure witnesses, and 
appeal an adverse decision.”46 The IIRIRA, in effect, made it easier for 
immigration officials to remove asylee applicants at the border by 
creating this “expedited removal” process.47 
The difficulty in the expedited removal process lies in the various 
technicalities that would render a refugee inadmissible and subject to 
expedited removal. Whether these technicalities preclude a refugee 
from claiming asylum largely turns on the discretion of the immigration 
and asylum officer. For example, when a refugee presents at the border, 
an immigration officer must refer the alien for an interview by an 
asylum officer.48 If, however, the immigration officer suspects that the 
43 Eunice Lee, Regulating the Border, 79 MD. L. REV. 374, 391–92 (2020).  
44 Id. at 391.  
45 Id. at 391–92.  
46 Id. at 392.  
47 Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (a)–(b).  
48 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). For clarification, the term “alien” is used as it is the 
statutory term in application for asylum. However, previous usage of the term “refugee” will 
continue to be used as previously employed unless the reference is to the statutory text. 
Insofar as “alien” is used, for purposes of this Article, it is interchangeable with “refugee.” 
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alien “may be inadmissible” under subparagraph (A), the officer “shall 
order the alien removed.”49 Under section 1225, an alien is 
inadmissible if her or she willfully makes material misrepresentations 
to procure a visa or admission into the United States or if they are not 
in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa, reentry permit, or 
border crossing ID.50 Although aliens are not subject to expedited 
removal if they indicate either an “intention to apply for asylum” or a 
fear of persecution, it is not required that immigration officers make 
such a determination before they suspect an alien is inadmissible.51 If 
the immigration officer does determine an alien has claimed asylum or 
conveys a fear of persecution, then the alien may proceed to the 
credible fear interview with an asylum officer.52 
Moreover, even though the asylum officer must be an immigration 
officer who “has had professional training in country conditions, 
asylum law, and interview techniques comparable” to full- 
time adjudicators or is supervised by an officer meeting those 
requirements,53 this does not preclude an administration from 
employing officers who are ill-equipped to handle such interviews. 
This results in an erosion of procedures aimed at assisting potential 
asylees with valid claims.54 Indeed, that the Trump administration 
directed Customs and Border Protection officers to conduct screenings 
is likely illegal considering the training requirements.55 Additionally, 
where an asylum officer determines that the alien has not met the 
credible fear of persecution standard, the officer “shall order the alien 
removed from the United States without further hearing or review.”56 
Consequently, an officer who has little to no training on asylum 
procedure and is generally skeptical regarding an alien’s statements 
In an effort to use more humanizing language than “alien” and “refugee,” as these terms 
carry a negative connotation or are used as derogatory terms, the terms “noncitizen,” 
“migrant,” or “asylum seeker” are used in this Article when specific reference to statutory 
text is not necessary or context does not require usage of alien or refugee. For purposes of 
this Article, the above terms describe non-United States citizens seeking asylum in the 
United States.   
49 8 U.S.C. § 1225(c)(1)(A); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (stating that an alien 
is inadmissible if subject to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C) or § 1182(a)(7)).  
50 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7).  
51 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i)–(ii).  
52 O.A. v. Trump, 404 F. Supp. 3d 109, 120 (D.D.C. 2019). 
53 8 U.S.C § 1225(b)(1)(E).  
54 Lee, supra note 43, at 399–400.  
55 Id. at 396.  
56 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(1)(B)(iii)(I).  
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can, at their sole discretion, determine to remove the alien without 
further consideration by an immigration judge. 
2. Structural Biases
In addition to legislative changes making it more difficult for
refugees to claim asylum, the structure of the immigration adjudicatory 
system tends to favor the agency tasked with enforcing the immigration 
laws. Notably, although the Executive Office for Immigration 
Review (EOIR) adjudicates immigration cases, the Attorney General 
established the EOIR as part of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).57 
The Director of the EOIR supervises immigration judges and the 
BIA.58 Furthermore, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 
agency under which immigration and asylum officers work, appears on 
behalf of the government.59 Though the DOJ and DHS are theoretically 
distinct, practically, both agencies still exist under the broad umbrella 
of the Executive.60 With the policies of an administration guiding 
executive agencies, it is more likely than not that various agencies 
would work in tandem as opposed to being adversaries.61 Where the 
agency in charge of interviews—which largely form and, effectively, 
drive the claim through the system—is reviewed by an agency that may 
be equally as biased, the potential erosion of due process protections is 
highly likely.62  
This is not to suggest that there is a likelihood of systemic bias 
merely because agencies overlap jurisdictions in handling immigration 
claims. Rather, this Article suggests, discussed further below, that in a 
system where multiple agencies have the potential to function in unison 
to erode due process protections without substantive review of agency 
action by another branch, the likelihood of due process protections 
being eroded is high. Indeed, this likelihood is further heightened 
57 Melissa J. Hernandez Pimentel, The Invisible Refugee: Examining the Board of 
Immigration Appeals’ “Social Visibility” Doctrine, 76 MO. L. REV. 575, 578 (2011). 
58 Id.  
59 Id.  
60 See Ming H. Chen, Administrator-in-Chief: The President and Executive Action in 
Immigration Law, 69 ADMIN. L. REV. 347, 358–403 (2017). 
61 See Kavitha Surana, How Racial Profiling Goes Unchecked in Immigration 
Enforcement, PROPUBLICA (June 8, 2018, 5:00 AM), https://www.propublica.org/article 
/racial-profiling-ice-immigration-enforcement-pennsylvania [https://perma.cc/9A9E-KLEX].  
62 See generally Fatma E. Marouf, Implicit Bias and Immigration Courts, 45 NEW ENG. 
L. REV. 417 (2011) (examining how factors such as immigration judges’ lack of
independence and low risk of judicial review allow implicit bias to drive the adjudication of
immigration claims, thereby negatively affecting marginalized groups).
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when the issue the agencies are tasked with administering is highly 
politicized, divisive, and a key agenda of an administration, 
demonstrated in President Trump’s immigration rhetoric.  
Moreover, merely having an administrative agenda does not give 
rise to abuses of power with overlapping agencies. If that were so, then 
this argument would reach too far and capture agencies that necessitate 
overlapping jurisdictions. If, however, the politicization of a particular 
issue undermines the purpose of agencies—specialized expertise—
then, where evidence demonstrates that executive decisions are based 
on politicized agendas, more comprehensive review is necessary. 
Much like President Trump has authority over officers who are not 
sympathetic or adequately trained in administering credible fear 
interviews,63 a staunch anti-immigration Attorney General can further 
galvanize any structural biases considering the Attorney General’s 
broad power in overseeing the immigration system.64 
3. BIA Interpretations
BIA decisions further affect the very definitions of undefined
categories such as the social group standard, discussed above. Matter 
of M-E-V-G expanded on the interpretation of the social group standard 
handed down by the Acosta Board.65 In Matter of M-E-V-G, the Board 
incorporated criteria of particularity and social distinction into the 
definition of membership in a particular social group.66 Further, 
the Board considered the criteria consistent with the immutable 
characteristic standard in Matter of Acosta.67 The former is satisfied 
when the group is “discrete and [has] definable boundaries—and it 
must not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”68 The latter 
criteria refers to the “social recognition” of a group (i.e., perceived as 
63 Lee, supra note 43, at 396. 
64 Jessica Senat, The Asylum Makeover: Chevron Deference, the Self-Referral and 
Review Authority, 35 TOURO L. REV. 867, 888–89 (2019) (discussing the issues with the 
self-referral provision, which allows the Attorney General, the BIA, and the Secretary of the 
DHS to refer immigration cases to themselves at their own discretion). Moreover, any 
decisions taken in those self-referred cases carry precedential weight. Id. See also Jill E. 
Family, Beyond Decisional Independence: Uncovering Contributors to the Immigration 
Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 544–46 (2011).  
65 M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237–38 (B.I.A. Feb. 7, 2014). 
66 Id. at 237. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 239.  
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a group by society).69 However, these additional elements can muddle 
the waters. That is, “if the applicant provides evidence proving that the 
society in question uses specific parameters to define the social group, 
rendering them ‘socially distinct,’ these parameters may not satisfy the 
particularity requirement if the BIA finds that it is too ‘broad’ or 
‘amorphous.’”70 
4. Attorney General Intervention and Executive Action
Executive acts, via the Attorney General or the President, can
demonstrate a clear political influence on the immigration system. 
Indeed, one of the more pivotal political appointments a President can 
make is selecting an Attorney General. Although an Attorney General 
is customarily an independent actor and not beholden to every directive 
given by the Commander in Chief, Attorney General (AG) William 
Barr notwithstanding, an Attorney General can ideologically mirror an 
administration such that they function as an extension of any divisive 
rhetoric.  
An Attorney General is afforded significant discretion regarding 
self-referring a case for his or her review, and this self-referral 
invariably carries precedential weight.71 For example, AG Barr 
overturned a BIA decision that held “immediate family” constituted a 
“particular social group” under the social group standard, discussed 
above.72 Similarly, former AG Sessions overruled a decision 
“effectively limiting the availability of asylum to most individuals 
fleeing gender-based violence or violence at the hands of gangs—each 
of which is often central to the fears of harm that prompt people from 
El Salvador to flee to the United States.”73 
69 Id. at 240. 
70 Senat, supra note 64, at 873–74 (citing Rachel Gonzalez Settlage, Rejecting the 
Children of Violence: Why U.S. Asylum Law Should Return to the Acosta Definition of “A 
Particular Social Group,” 30 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 287, 310 (2016)); see also Hernandez 
Pimentel, supra note 57, at 582–92 (discussing the three main approaches in defining the 
social group standard adopted by various BIA courts and federal circuits and noting the 
inconsistencies in all three approaches).  
71 Senat, supra note 64, at 888–89.  
72 Compare L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 581, 581 (U.S. Dep’t of Just. July 29, 2019) 
(“[M]ost nuclear families are not inherently socially distinct and therefore do not qualify as 
‘particular social groups.’”), with L-E-A-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 40 (B.I.A. May 24, 2017) (holding 
that immediate family is a particular social group).  
73 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEPORTED TO DANGER: UNITED STATES DEPORTATION 
POLICIES EXPOSE SALVADORANS TO DEATH AND ABUSE 106 (2020); see also A-B-, 27 I. 
& N. Dec. 316 (A.G. 2018); see also E-F-H-L-, 27 I. & N. Dec. 226 (U.S. Dep’t of Just. 
Mar. 5, 2018). But cf. A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (B.I.A. Aug. 26, 2014) (establishing 
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With respect to executive action, one policy serves as a stark 
reminder of the breadth of avenues by which the President can alter 
immigration enforcement. In January 2019, President Trump instituted 
the Migrant Protection Protocols (MPP).74 Under this policy, “the 
U.S. . . . returns to Mexico nearly all asylum seekers who have been 
put into removal proceedings.”75 Often, these asylum seekers are 
vulnerable populations, and this policy “regularly results in family 
separations.”76 Discussed above, the initial interviewing officers may 
not be adequately trained, resulting in fewer protections for those 
seeking asylum.  
II 
AGENCY DEFERENCE AND IMMIGRATION 
Where a noncitizen applies for asylum, it is within the discretion of 
the immigration judge whether the evidence presented during the 
course of a credible fear interview and the subsequent proceedings 
satisfies the credible fear standard for asylum status.77 Similar to 
federal appellate courts, the BIA applies a clearly erroneous standard 
of review for the lower tribunal’s factual findings but reviews de novo 
questions of law, discretion, judgment, and all other issues in the 
appeal.78  
The BIA standard of review, however, has had serious issues 
regarding its scope of review.79 This difficulty in determining the scope 
of review arises, in part, from the BIA conflating what it considers to 
be a question of fact and a question of law—exemplified by certain 
BIA decisions determining that “events that have not yet occurred 
domestic violence survivors as a “particular social group” under U.S. asylum law in certain 
cases); c.f. Memorandum from Joseph E. Langlois, Chief, Asylum Div., U.S. Citizenship 
& Immigr. Servs. (Mar. 2, 2010), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/USCIS/Laws 
/Memoranda/2010/Asylum-Ramos-Div-2-mar-2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/6K8Z-S4F4] 
(discussing circuit court precedent in which gang membership is considered to be a 
“particular social group” under U.S. asylum law in certain cases).  
74 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 73, at 102–03. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 103.  
77 Hernandez Pimentel, supra note 57, at 579.  
78 Id.  
79 Scott Rempell, The Board of Immigration Appeals’ Standard of Review: An Argument 
for Regulatory Reform, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 283, 290 (2011) (“[T]he Board fails to 
consistently define the scope of its review. Irrespective of the analysis employed, the fact 
that the Board decisions are both internally inconsistent and inconsistent with the attorney 
general’s commentary is itself problematic.”). 
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cannot be considered facts.”80 This would cause issues, as asylum 
applicants would necessarily have to divulge facts indicating a fear of 
persecution if they were to return to their home country. These facts 
necessarily are events that have yet to occur. 
Fortunately, in response to an overwhelming number of federal 
circuit courts striking down the BIA’s application of de novo review 
regarding the possibility of future events, the BIA overruled its prior 
decision.81 Though federal courts were able to address a logically 
inconsistent standard of review,82 most applicants do not make it to this 
step of review.83 Moreover, that BIA decisions are appealed at a 
significantly low rate compared to the number of claims84 suggests that 
the opportunities an Article III court has to review these agency 
decisions are very limited, irrespective of whether the reviewing court 
employs Chevron deference.85 
A. Chevron Deference
A cornerstone of judicial review of agency decisions, the Chevron 
doctrine has prescribed that federal courts bend a deferential ear to 
agency decisions on the premise that the agency’s expertise and the 
political accountability of the Executive Branch warrant such 
deferential review.86 In short, the two-step mode of analysis begins 
with the reviewing court examining if Congress directly spoke on the 
80 Id. at 291–94; see also A-S-B-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 493 (B.I.A. May 8, 2008). 
81 Z-Z-O-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 586, 589 (B.I.A. May 26, 2015) (“[T]he Second, Third, 
Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have . . . held that an Immigration Judge’s 
finding that a future event will occur is a finding of fact that the Board must review under 
the clearly erroneous standard.”) (citations omitted).  
82 Id. 
83 See David North, Immigration, the Courts, and Statistics, CTR. FOR IMMIGR. STUD. 
(Mar. 4, 2016), https://cis.org/North/Immigration-Courts-and-Statistics [https://perma.cc 
/3BR7-B6MY]. The percentage of BIA decisions appealed to federal circuits varies from 
1.9% to 48.70%, with the Ninth Circuit being the only circuit above 20%. Id. Moreover, the 
statistics indicate that only five circuits have applicant-friendly decisions above 10%. Id.  
84 See U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., EXEC. OFF. FOR IMMIGR. REV., STATISTICS YEARBOOK 
(2018), https://www.justice.gov/eoir/file/1198896/download [https://perma.cc/73RX 
-DGUW].
85 David Hausman, The Failure of Immigration Appeals, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1177, 1179–
80 (2016) (discussing factors affecting appeal rates in immigration decisions and disparities
between removal and appeal rates).
86 Bassina Farbenblum, Executive Deference in U.S. Refugee Law: Internationalist
Paths Through and Beyond Chevron, 60 DUKE L.J. 1059, 1078–80 (2011); see also Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984) (reasoning that
political accountability of the Executive Branch and agency expertise are justifications for
courts to defer to agencies).
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issue before the court (i.e., determining whether the organic act is silent 
on the particular issue).87 If the intent of Congress is unclear, the next 
step for the court is to determine whether the agency interpretation is 
based on a “permissible construction of the statute.”88 It is well settled 
that Chevron deference is applicable to the INA.89 
One criticism, however, is that in the context of immigration, 
reviewing courts are “too deferential to interpretations made by the 
attorney general.”90 This concern is compounded by the fact that the 
Supreme Court has sparingly addressed Chevron deference in the 
immigration context compared to the number of asylum applications 
and appeals filed each year.91  
B. Agency Deference in Immigration
Absent an opinion upending Chevron deference in the immigration 
context,92 the current framework of jurisprudence in immigration cases 
“demonstrate[s] the Court’s lack of a coherent approach to the role of 
the [Refugee] Convention in establishing the construction of domestic 
asylum provisions or of any consistent methodology for interpreting 
the treaty’s terms.”93 This is in part due to federal circuits deferring to 
the BIA’s construction of the Refugee Act, despite the BIA’s 
interpretations being inconsistent with international treaties that 
heavily influenced the Refugee Act.94  
87 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
88 Id. at 843.  
89 Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516 (2009) (citing I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 
U.S. 415, 424 (1999)). 
90 Brian G. Slocum, The Immigration Rule of Lenity and Chevron Deference, 17 GEO. 
IMMIGR. L.J. 515, 530 (2003). 
91 Farbenblum, supra note 86, at 1085. 
92 Though outside the scope of this Article, one case currently before the Supreme Court 
may significantly affect the future of Chevron deference in the immigration context. See Dai 
v. Sessions, 884 F.3d 858 (9th Cir. 2018), cert. granted sub nom. Wilkinson v. Dai, No. 19-
1155 (argued Feb. 23, 2021). As of the publication of this Article, the Supreme Court has
not issued an opinion in Wilkinson v. Dai. The legal question in Dai primarily rests on
whether a federal appellate court can reverse, without remand to the lower tribunal, the
denial of an asylum application where the Immigration Judge and Board of Immigration
Appeals do not make an adverse credibility finding. Brief for Respondent at i, 2–3, sub nom.
Wilkinson v. Dai, No. 19-1155 (argued Feb. 23, 2021). Though the parties’ arguments
revolve on the Ninth Circuit’s application of the substantial evidence standard of review,
this matter provides an opportunity for the Court to address the tension between the federal
judiciary’s oversight role of immigration agency decisions and statutory deference.
93 Farbenblum, supra note 86, at 1085. 
94 Id. at 1084.  
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In I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca,95 the first of three landmark cases, the 
Court limited Chevron in three significant ways.96 First, it limited the 
applicability of Chevron deference by distinguishing BIA decisions 
that fill statutory gaps from those addressing “pure issues of statutory 
construction.”97 Significantly, the second manner in which the 
Cardoza-Fonseca Court limited Chevron was by looking to standards 
under the Refugee Convention and the supporting materials to 
inform statutory interpretation.98 Lastly, the Cardoza-Fonseca Court 
counseled lower courts to examine the legislative history of the 
Refugee Act to determine whether “Congress expressed an intention 
about the statute’s meaning that was contrary to its plain language.”99 
In the second landmark case, I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, however, the 
Court changed course by holding that deference to the BIA was 
appropriate because the “Attorney General, while retaining ultimate 
authority, has vested the BIA with power to exercise the ‘discretion and 
authority conferred upon the Attorney General by law’” when 
considering cases before it.100 Notably, the Court cited possible 
implications to foreign relations as a driving principle for deference to 
BIA interpretations.101 Reversing the Ninth Circuit’s holding, which 
based its interpretation of the INA on an international U.N. handbook 
that was a supporting material to the Refugee Protocol,102 the Aguirre 
Court held that the U.N. handbook was not binding on the Attorney 
General,103 the BIA, or U.S. courts. Therefore, the Court held that 
deference to the BIA would be appropriate.104 
95 480 U.S. 421 (1987). 
96 Farbenblum, supra note 86, at 1086.  
97 Id. (explaining that the Cardoza-Fonseca Court declined to defer to the BIA’s 
construction regarding the evidentiary standard for asylum status, instead “embracing the 
[Refugee] Convention-based approach”). 
98 Id. at 1087. 
99 Id. at 1088; see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 432 n.12 (determining that the 
legislative history of the Refugee Act provides additional support to the Court’s holding that 
Congress did not intend to limit asylum eligibility to aliens who satisfied the standard the 
Court considered consistent with international treaties). 
100 I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999) (citing regulation 8 C.F.R. 
§ 3.1(d)(1) (1998) as the basis for the Attorney General conferring discretion to the BIA).
101 Id. (“A decision by the Attorney General to deem certain violent offenses committed
in another country as political in nature, and to allow the perpetrators to remain in the United 
States, may affect our relations with that country or its neighbors. The judiciary is not well 
positioned to shoulder primary responsibility for assessing the likelihood and importance of 
such diplomatic repercussions.”). 
102 Id. at 428–29, 433. 
103 Id. at 427–28.  
104 Id. at 427–30.  
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The last landmark case, Negusie v. Holder, “considered the 
relationship between Chevron deference and congressional intent to 
implement the Convention.”105 The issue before the Court was whether 
the prosecutor bar, which rendered a noncitizen inadmissible if they 
persecuted others, applied when the noncitizen “was compelled to 
assist in persecution.”106 Though the Court noted the BIA’s 
misapplication of law regarding the prosecutor bar, the Court reasoned 
that “[w]hen the BIA has not spoken on ‘a matter that statutes place 
primarily in agency hands,’ our ordinary rule is to remand to ‘giv[e] the 
BIA the opportunity to address the matter in the first instance in light 
of its own expertise.’”107 Importantly, the Court “concluded that the 
BIA ha[d] not yet exercised its Chevron discretion to interpret the 
statute in question” and determined “remand to the agency for 
additional investigation or explanation” was the appropriate 
decision.108  
A troubling aspect of the Negusie decision is that although the Court 
did acknowledge that the intent of the Refugee Act was to bring 
domestic asylum law in accordance with international principles, “the 
majority did not consider, or even mention, Article 1F or the [Refugee] 
Convention.”109 Indeed, Justice Stevens’ concurrence indicates as 
much by highlighting the congressional intent of the Refugee Act.110 
Moreover, this stands in stark contrast to Cardoza-Fonseca. 
In effect, the majority’s omission of congressional intent related to 
the Refugee Protocol and the Refugee Convention amounts to a blank 
check for BIA decisions. Put another way, that the Court’s analysis 
does not focus on the international treaties contemplated by the 
Refugee Act allows for BIA interpretations to diverge from those 
humanitarian treaties without being deemed inconsistent with 
congressional intent, thereby affording Chevron deference to those 
interpretations. This, arguably, is tantamount to the judiciary rubber-
stamping BIA interpretations that would otherwise be inconsistent with 
the more humanitarian and inclusive approaches promoted by the 
105 Farbenblum, supra note 86, at 1092. 
106 Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 516 (2009); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(2)(A)(i); 
8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(B)(i).  
107 Negusie, 555 U.S. at 517 (quoting I.N.S. v. Orlando Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 
(2002) (per curiam)). 
108 Id. at 523 (quoting Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006)). 
109 Farbenblum, supra note 86, at 1094.  
110 Negusie, 555 U.S. at 536–37. 
438 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99, 419 
Refugee Convention. If the foregoing demonstrates anything, it is this: 
Supreme Court guidance regarding Chevron deference in immigration 
is likely to reinforce already pervasive systemic issues in immigration 
administration.  
Additionally, a doctrine related to Chevron deference equally affects 
immigration law—namely, the Brand X doctrine.111 Under Brand X, 
“[a] court’s prior judicial construction of a statute trumps an agency 
construction otherwise entitled to Chevron deference only if the prior 
court decision holds that its construction follows from the 
unambiguous terms of the statute and thus leaves no room for agency 
discretion.”112 Citing concerns regarding separation of powers—that 
is, that the judiciary would have preclusive final say over agency 
interpretations—the Brand X Court reasoned that “[o]nly a judicial 
precedent holding that the statute unambiguously forecloses the 
agency’s interpretation, and therefore contains no gap for the agency to 
fill, displaces a conflicting agency construction.”113  
Ironically, in an effort to address criticisms of separation of powers 
going the other way—that the agency could effectively overrule 
judicial precedent—Justice Thomas draws an analogy to how state 
courts can arrive at a different, yet consistent with federal courts, 
interpretation of a state’s law.114 Justice Thomas addresses a separation 
of powers criticism with a retort centered on federalism. That federal 
courts and state courts, functioning within the same branch, arrive at 
different interpretations of state law does not bear on another branch’s 
ability to sidestep judicial precedent, thereby receiving Chevron 
deference with the revised interpretation.  
The future of Brand X, however, may be short-lived, as its own 
author, Justice Thomas, has expressed a willingness to overrule his own 
opinion.115 Indeed, then-judge-now-Justice Gorsuch has been and 
continues to be a vocal critic of not only Chevron deference but also of 
Brand X.116 Considering Justice Thomas conveyed his penchant for 
overruling Brand X in a dissent to a denied petition and coupled with 
111 See Nat’l Cable & Telecomm. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
112 Id. at 982.  
113 Id. at 982–83.  
114 Id. at 983–84.  
115 Baldwin v. United States, 140 S. Ct. 690, 694 (2020) (Thomas, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
116 See Gutierrez-Brizuela v. Lynch, 834 F.3d 1142, 1150 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, J., 
concurring) (voicing disdain for Brand X as a circuit court judge).  
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Justice Gorsuch’s stance,117 it is likely that garnering four votes is 
probable and may soon provide the Court with another opportunity to 
address Brand X. Moreover, with the arguable crawling back of Auer 
deference, the future of Chevron deference and Brand X is, at best, in 
a precarious position.118  
Whether overruling Chevron provides a net positive regarding 
tension between the judiciary and the executive agencies has yet to be 
determined. Although this Article does address structural shortfalls 
and how Chevron deference may contribute to systemic issues in 
immigration administration, this is not to suggest that overruling 
Chevron is the best course of action. In fact, overruling Chevron may 
prove to be detrimental to substantive immigration reform in the long 
run. President Trump has altered the face of the federal judiciary, 
dwarfing the number of confirmed judicial appointments of both the 
Bush and Obama administrations.119 This increase in Trump-appointed 
judges raises the likelihood of drawing a conservative majority on a 
panel.120 Trump-appointed judges have already influenced various 
areas including immigration.121 
Herein lies the quagmire: overrule Chevron, and an increasingly 
conservative and anti-immigration judiciary has control over 
immigration case law for the foreseeable future; or retain Chevron 
deference and continue with the general trend of deference to an 
interagency system where any meaningful change can be unilaterally 
upended by the Attorney General of the week. Indeed, Chevron 
deference can underscore an administration’s efforts to effectively 
process and address asylees, but where an administration takes a 
117 See id. at 1151 (criticizing Chevron, and Brand X as its logical extension) (“Chevron 
seems no less than a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty.”). 
118 See Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019) (limiting the application of Auer 
deference).  
119 Russell Wheeler, Judicial Appointments in Trump’s First Three Years: Myths and 
Realities, BROOKINGS (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/fixgov/2020/01/28 
/judicial-appointments-in-trumps-first-three-years-myths-and-realities/ [https://perma.cc 
/Q79U-JNJV]. 
120 Tom McCarthy, Trump’s Judges: A Revolution to Create a New Conservative 
America, GUARDIAN (Apr. 28, 2020, 5:00 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news 
/2020/apr/28/donald-trump-judges-create-new-conservative-america-republicans [https:// 
perma.cc/4EBE-EBCM].  
121 Confirmed Judges, Confirmed Fears, PEOPLE FOR THE AM. WAY, https: 
//confirmedfears.com [https://perma.cc/F8Y5-WFW2] (last visited Feb. 3, 2020) 
(presenting an interactive database of decisions by Trump-appointed judges by topic and the 
individual judge, with immigration topics indicating eighty-four decisions by Trump-
appointed judges invariably favoring immigration agency decisions).  
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xenophobic stance on immigration, Chevron deference may only serve 
to entrench those ideals in administrative and federal case law.122 Bleak 
as these options are, a middle road is more likely. That is, Chevron may 
be scaled back similarly to Auer deference. Indeed, considering how 
the Roberts Court deals with Chevron in the near future, Chevron may 
still be able to serve a role in future reform. This uncertainty should, in 
fact, counsel against interpreting Chevron as it currently stands. 
However, unless and until the Supreme Court revisits Chevron, the 
following proposals to the current doctrine could alleviate systemic 
pitfalls.  
III 
STRUCTURAL ISSUES AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS 
Parts I and II demonstrate that the structural issues affecting the 
immigration system stem from three main sources: (1) the credible fear 
interview; (2) the discretion of the Attorney General; and (3) the 
current jurisprudence of Chevron deference in immigration law. As this 
section will show, the solutions to these issues are (1) the creation of 
an Article I immigration court, (2) the video recording of the credible 
fear interviews, (3) the creation of an Office of the Commissioner 
within the new immigration court system, and (4) the return to the 
Cardoza-Fonseca form of bifurcated analysis or a Step-Zero-like 
analysis.  
A. Summary of Structural Issues in Immigration
Regarding the credible fear interview, former AG Sessions’s 
pronouncement regarding the zero-tolerance policy affected migrants’ 
ability to claim asylum because many would not have the required 
documentation and would therefore be inadmissible under the current 
statutory framework. Moreover, the immigration officer’s discretion 
affects the trajectory of the asylum claim. If the officer suspects the 
refugee of illegally entering the country, the refugee is referred, under 
the zero-tolerance policy, to DHS for criminal prosecution and is 
subject to expedited removal without seeing an immigration judge.  
If a refugee does obtain a referral to an asylum officer, that refugee 
will continue to experience hurdles because the asylum officer has 
broad discretion to determine whether a refugee has satisfied the 
122 See J. Kirk McGill & Ben K. McGill, Lucia v. SEC: Justice Breyer Warns of 
Dramatic Expansion of the President’s Control over the Federal Civil Service, 96 DENV.  
L. REV. 104, 105 (2018).
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credible fear standard and can also deport a refugee via expedited 
removal. This pitfall is only exacerbated by U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection officers, who have a “history of abuse of and misconduct 
towards asylum seekers,” administering the credible fear interviews.123 
Moreover, unless the refugee is hearing impaired, a translator is not 
provided during the interview.124 Considering this interview can often 
be dispositive of an asylum application, the combination of factors 
listed above renders a high likelihood that otherwise qualifying asylum 
applicants are precluded from entry or a meaningful review of their 
status as potential asylees.  
Even if a refugee indicates the intention to apply for asylum, obtains 
a credible fear interview with an asylum officer, and successfully 
obtains an evidentiary hearing before an immigration judge, the 
immigration judge may still hand down an adverse decision as they and 
the BIA answer to the Attorney General.125 Moreover, this is 
compounded by the Attorney General’s discretion to self-refer cases 
that he or she does not agree with.126 
B. Proposed Solutions
With respect to the credible fear interview and the discretion of the 
Attorney General, a solution addressing those shortfalls would be 
for Congress to create an immigration court system under Article I, 
similar to the tax or bankruptcy court system.127 Although there are 
principles underscoring the utility of agencies—expertise and political 
accountability—these principles should not further the consolidation of 
power where the potential for systematic abuse is high and can result 
in harm to vulnerable people. Often, these same asylum seekers are 
escaping conditions that were created by prior U.S. diplomatic 
123 FOIA Lawsuit Demands Information About CBP Officers’ Role in Credible Fear 
Interview Process, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org 
/litigation/foia-lawsuit-demands-information-about-cbp-officers-role-credible-fear-interview 
-process [https://perma.cc/7L9P-S7FD] (last visited Feb. 3, 2020).
124 Preparing for Your Asylum Interview, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERV.,
https://www.uscis.gov/humanitarian/refugees-and-asylum/asylum/preparing-your-asylum
-interview [https://perma.cc/AN7Z-3H9K] (Sept. 22, 2020).
125 Family, supra note 64, at 543 (“The lack of decisional independence stems from the
placement of immigration judges and the Board as mere employees of the Attorney General.
The entire Board exists by regulation only, and the Attorney General is ultimately in charge
of hiring, firing, training, and reviewing the immigration judge corps. The bureaucratic
placement of the adjudicators signals dependence on a politically appointed prosecutor.”).
126 Senat, supra note 64, at 888–89. 
127 26 U.S.C. § 7441; 28 U.S.C. § 151. 
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policies.128 The creation of an independent court system would 
substantially curb the Attorney General’s control over the immigration 
system. 
Moreover, the initial interviews should be video recorded in addition 
to the written application generated by the asylum officer, as this would 
address potential translation issues or serve as a deterrent for asylum 
officers to inappropriately dismiss supported claims.129 In addition to 
video recording the credible fear interviews, Congress should also 
establish within the Article I immigration court system an officer 
similar to that of an appellate commissioner. This commissioner would 
serve as a threshold judicial officer reviewing only denied claims to 
determine whether the initial denial by the asylum officer was correct 
and that the credible fear interview was properly conducted. The 
immigration judge would continue to review claims the asylum office 
deems meritorious, and the commissioner would refer any denied 
claims the commissioner finds appropriate for the immigration judge 
to review. Additionally, that interviewing officers know their conduct 
is being recorded and reviewed by an independent body may deter 
unreported abuses.  
Lastly, Chevron deference has served to reinforce a system that 
should otherwise not be afforded deference, especially if the BIA 
decisions do not align with the Refugee Act’s intent to incorporate 
the Refugee Protocol and Refugee Convention. If the above neutral 
court system were adopted, a structure of deference to an Article I court 
may, in fact, function as originally intended. However, absent such a 
system, the current Chevron doctrine in the immigration context 
should, at the least, return to the Cardoza-Fonseca form of bifurcated 
analysis. That is, BIA decisions filling in statutory gaps still undergo 
the traditional Chevron analysis, whereas issues of pure statutory 
construction should not be afforded deference. Additionally, focus on 
the original international treaties that animated the Refugee Act should 
drive statutory interpretation.  
128 See supra Part I. 
129 Asylum Officer’s Notes from Credible Fear Interview, IMMIGR. JUST. CAMPAIGN, 
https://immigrationjustice.us/get-trained/credible-and-reasonable-fear/understanding-what 
-happens-during-a-credible-reasonable-fear-interview/transcript-of-interview/?mode=list
[https://perma.cc/2EQD-K3CM] (last visited Feb. 3, 2020); see also Lee, supra note 43, at
400 (“Many interviews take place telephonically, with no ability for the adjudicator and the
applicant to establish in-person rapport. The interviews are not recorded, and interpretation
problems plague the process, such that asylum seekers often receive inadequate or no
interpretation in their primary language.”).
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Alternatively, considering that political accountability and expertise 
underscore agency utility, a reviewing court should, in a Step-Zero-like 
analysis,130 determine if political accountability severely undermines 
agency expertise. In other words, if the record demonstrates that certain 
actions by the Executive Branch effectively inhibit the agency from 
employing its expertise, then, at a minimum, Chevron deference should 
be questioned. At most, it should be inappropriate to afford Chevron 
deference to agency action. For example, where the Attorney General 
unilaterally overrules a BIA decision, despite substantive contrary 
precedent or inadequate reasoning, the reviewing court should decline 
to apply the Chevron framework.  
Additionally, when applying the Chevron framework, reviewing 
courts should generally distinguish between the kind and level of 
expertise that underscores agency action. The Chevron Court did rely 
on agency expertise when crafting its deference principles.131 In fact, 
the Court noted that courts, on the whole, were not experts in 
the technicalities pertaining to pollution-emitting devices.132 This 
deference is reasonable considering courts are, by nature, generalists 
when addressing matters of law. Thus, they may lack the expertise of a 
more specialized body. 
Expertise, however, should not be a blanket term, effectively barring 
a court from addressing an issue. Rather, where the “expertise” of an 
agency strongly resembles the same aspects that make judges experts 
in their own right, agency expertise should give way to judicial review. 
The credible fear interview is exactly the type of interaction that a judge 
can have near equal expertise in adjudicating. Though a judge may not 
be readily familiar with background history of the refugees’ home 
nation, the credible fear interview deals with aspects the judge is 
undoubtably an expert in—namely, credibility determinations and 
procedural integrity. To argue that the immigration and asylum officers 
are experts distinct from a judge would be to undermine a court’s 
ability to adjudicate the same evidence presented. Moreover, if 
immigration judges or the BIA have expertise distinct from an Article 
130 King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473 (2015) (establishing the controversial “Major 
Questions” doctrine, which posits that certain questions with such sweeping impact are 
appropriately reserved for the judiciary, thereby rendering Chevron inapplicable); see also 
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 136 S. Ct. 2117, 2125 (2016) (holding that Chevron 
does not apply to statutory interpretations produced through defective procedures).  
131 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984). 
132 Id. at 865–66.  
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III judge, it would be only insofar as familiarity with the body of law, 
not the skill set. Accordingly, expertise alone should not serve as 
justification for deference, especially when agency expertise so closely 
resembles the expertise of a reviewing court.  
CONCLUSION 
In short, immigration in today’s political discourse is extremely 
divisive, and a prevailing reason for this is the structure of the 
immigration system. Regardless of political stance, a humanitarian 
crisis where vulnerable refugees are harmed should not be a result of 
any system under the rule of law. However, the structure of the 
immigration system allows for a xenophobic administration to abuse 
its power at the cost of human suffering. Because the agency 
conducting the interview for asylum and the courts reviewing the same 
claim both answer to the President, a President can upend a system only 
weeks into a new administration. Moreover, the Attorney General’s 
broad discretionary power makes meaningful change within the system 
unlikely.  
Accordingly, the solution that would most adequately address the 
failings of the current immigration system would be for Congress to 
establish an Article I immigration court system. Also, video recording 
of asylum interviews would present a more accurate depiction of what 
qualifies a refugee for asylee status before an immigration judge. 
Additionally, creating an office of the commissioner within the new 
immigration court system would function as a backstop for denied 
claims that would otherwise be viable. 
In the immigration context, Chevron deference should be afforded 
only where the BIA fills in statutory gaps, not when it deals with an 
issue of pure statutory construction. In general, where conduct by the 
Executive suggests that agency expertise is severely curtailed, the 
reviewing court should not afford Chevron deference. Lastly, the 
reviewing court should distinguish between the kind and type of 
expertise, and if the expertise is wholly distinct from that of the 
reviewing court, then deference is appropriate. If, however, the 
expertise underlying agency actions is similarly or closely analogous 
to the expertise of a court, then deference should not be afforded. 
